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CREDITORS in urging reforms of the bankruptcy laws have com-
monly complained that the debtors do not declare their in-
solvency in time to save at least some portion of the as-
sets. Strangely enough, the consequences of the debtor's delay
have not been analyzed in detail. The bankruptcy cases collected
by the Institute of Human Relations at Yale offer, therefore, an
unique opportunity. A sufficient number of cases has been col-
lected for our study, and we know from the articles of the super-
visors:' the exact basis of the research, what possible errors
have to be considered, and in what way the material might be
further developed.
The questionnaires used in this investigation did not contain
any direct question concerning the length of the period before
bankruptcy during which the debtor was insolvent. However,
the bankrupt was asked how long before bankruptcy he expe-
rienced difficulties in meeting his bills. This question is sufficient
for our purpose. Difficulties in meeting one's bills are, of course,
not always a symptom of insolvency. Delay in making collec-
tion and, especially in times of panic, difficulties in securing
credit may bring the most solvent business man into temporary
straits. But if the financial troubles continue during months or
years, the excuse of "frozen assets" cannot be used. The debtor
must not insert an asset in his balance-sheet at a valuation
higher than can be realized upon a sale within a reasonable time.
If a debtor is unable to procure within a reasonable time the
money necessary to meet his obligations, we can state that his
assets do not cover his liabilities and that he is insolvent.
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The answers to the question-how long before bankruptcy
difficulty was experienced in meeting bills, are the bases for our
study. The objection may be made that our foundation is un-
certain in that the bankrupts might have exaggerated the length
of that time in order to give the impression that they have not
yielded to the first difficulty. In practice, however, bankrupts
are not commonly criticized for going into bankruptcy too soon,
and they have therefore no reason to invent excuses fPr such
acts. On the contrary, the bankrupts in many cases minimize
the length of time of their difficulties, due in part to the over-
optimism of the average debtor.2
But this tendency does not make the answers of the debtors
worthless. Probably they do not accurately reflect the length of
the term, but they are reliable inasmuch as the true duration of
the difficulties is at least not shorter than the time stated. The
resulting figures are biased in the same direction, but the amount
of uncertainty becomes relatively unimportant when the figures
are compared with each other.,
The .questionnaires in 501 bankruptcies and 42 friendly ad-
justments in New Jersey during the fiscal year 1928-29 and 882
bankruptcies and 51 friendly adjustments in Boston during the
fiscal year 1930-31 were examined in connection with this ar-
ticl6. The New Jersey cases, with very few exceptions, and the
Boston friendly adjustments were business failures. The Boston
bankruptcy cases included 606 business failures; the remaining
276 bankrupts were wage-earners. Because of the fundamental
difference between the economic aspects of business and wage-
earner failures, we will treat these two classes separately.
II
The time from the beginning of the difficulties to the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy is referred to as the critical period.
In the cases of friendly adjustments this period terminates, of
course, at the date of the assignment in favor of the creditors.
In table 1 is shown the division of the cases in "time-groups"
according to the length of their critical period. It will be noted
that the petition was filed within the four months foreseen by
some provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 4 in very few of the
2NoEL, HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY (1919) 184.
3BOWLEY, ELEMENTS OF STATISTICS (1926) 191.
4 Sec. 3, subdiv. b. concerning the time of filing creditors' petitions of
bankruptcy; Sec. 14, subdiv. b., clause (4), concerning refusal of discharge
because of fraudulent transfer of property; See. 60, subdivisloins a. and b,,
concerning voidability of preferences; Sec. 67, subdivisions c, o, and f, con-




cases. In New Jersey, 19% of the friendly adjustments were
entered into and 11.4% of the bankruptcy petitions were filed
within this period. In Boston, the corresponding figures were
6% of the friendly adjustments, 7.5% of the business bankrupt-
cies and 1.9% of the wage-earner bankruptcies. On the other
hand, a critical period of two years or more was found in 25%
of the New Jersey friendly adjustments, 30.5% of the New Jer-
sey bankruptcies, 42% of the Boston friendly adjustments, 46.9%,'
of the Boston business bankruptcies and 66.4% of the Boston
wage-earner bankruptcies. The average lengths of the critical
periods are distributed as follows:
one year-New Jersey friendly adjustments
one year and a half-New Jersey bankruptcies
one year and a half-Boston friendly adjustments
two years-Boston business bankruptcies
three years and a half-Boston wage-earner bankruptcies
These figures correspond with the median in all classes with the
exception of the Boston wage-earner cases where the median
amounts to somewhat less than three years.
The reliability of these figures is not constant in the various
classes. In the Boston bankruptcies only 0.65% of the business
failures and 5.0% of the wage-earner cases had a critical period
of unknown length. But the length of this period was unknown
in 21.4% of the New Jersey bankruptcies, almost 30, of the
New Jersey friendly adjustments and 62% of the Boston friendly
adjustments. The "probable error" increases, of course, in the
same way, and therefore the figures must be used with some
caution.
III
In tables 2-4 the relation between the duration of the critical
period and the amount of the assets is shown. To be sure, the
sums scheduled by the bankrupts on wlhch the figures of the
questionnaires must rely, are as a rule above the true value of
the assets. But here again the error due to the one-sided bias
will diminish as w4 are dealing only with the comparison of the
SUMS.
In the New Jersey bankruptcies the percentage of cases with
no assets or assets of no more than $500 amounts to 9.7,1 of
the cases with a critical period of less than four months, against
40.0% of the cases with a critical period of four years or more.
In the Boston bankruptcies we find sufficient cases without any
assets to consider them separately. Of the business failures
32.6% of the cases with a critical period under four months, and
62% of the cases with a critical period of four years or more,
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have no assets. Among the wage-earners the percentage rises
from 58% in the group with a critical period of less than one
year to 83.5% in the group with a critical period of four years
or more.
These figures reveal also important differences between the
New Jersey bankruptcies and the Boston business and wage-
earner cases. In 23.6% of the New Jersey bankruptcies the
assets are not more than $500 and in 41.0% the assets are more
than $5,000. But 67.8% of the Boston business bankruptcies
have assets of not more than $500 and only 10.7% have assets
of more than $5,000. Among the Boston wage-earner cases
there are 92.6% with assets of not more than $500 and 3.0%
with assets of more than $5,000. On the other hand, the friendly
adjustment cases show in New Jersey, 12% with assets of not
more than $500 and 22% with assets of more than $5,000,
whereas in Boston no cases with assets of not more than $500
are found and 51% have assets of more than $5,000. Thus we
notice that the Boston cases, which showed average critical
periods appreciably longer than those of the New Jersey cases,
also exhibit average assets substantially smaller in amount.
Before discussing these figures we must consider the possi-
bility that the differences between the amount of assets within
the different groups might be due to a difference in the size of
business. If that were true, the amount of liabilities, which
is the best index of the size of the business, would be propor-
tionate to the assets. But upon examination no such tendency
was discovered in the bankruptcy cases.
Only among the friendly adjustments does the difference in
liabilities explain the divergence in assets. In Boston, no cases
with liabilities of not more than $2,500 can be found, whereas
in New Jersey, this group amounts to 27% of the total. This
deviation, obviously due to a different policy of the associa-
tions concerned with assignments in both districts, explains
the fact that the Boston friendly adjustments, in contrast to
New Jersey, have no cases with assets up to $500 although their
average critical period is longer.
But as for the bankruptcy cases, not only between the different
"time-groups," but also between the total averages of the New
Jersey failures and both classes of Boston cases, the differences
in the amount of assets are always in clear correlation to the
length of the critical period. Therefore we can state as a general
proposition: the longer the critical period, the smaller the assets.
IV
The relation between the length of the critical period and the
different types of business was also examined. We consider in
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this connection the New Jersey and Boston business failures
only, as there is, of course, no correlation between the insolvency
of wage-earners and the type of business in which they are em-
ployed.
The most important types of business failures both in New
Jersey and Boston, are retailers and contractors (including real-
estate men), forming in New Jersey 55.8% and 26.4%, in Boston
34.6% and 29.1%, respectively. The percentage of retailers is,
in both districts, highest in the group with a critical period
under four months, being in New Jersey 75.6c, in Boston 48.9%.
It is smallest in the group with a critical period of four years
or more, namely 28.6% and 22.1%, respectively. On the other
hand, the percentage of contractors rises from the first "time-
group" to the groups of cases with a critical period of two years
or more, in New Jersey from 8.9% to 36.9%, in Boston from
15.6% to 36.8%. In a similar way, the percentage of profes-
sional men rises and the percentage of manufacturers declines
according to the growth of the critical period.
The objection could be made that the "rule of decreasing
assets" as stated above, was only the result of these changes in
the composition of the different "time groups" as to the types
of business. But an examination of the most distinct type of
business, the contractor cases, proves that this is not true. The
differences in the amount of assets between these cases and the
total are quite irrelevant in the Boston failures, whereas the
deviation in the New Jersey cases is counterbalanced by the
fact that the "rule of decreasing assets" can be found also in the
contractors' class.
The economic importance of a business depends not only upon
its character but also, within each group, upon the amount of
capital needed. A study was made of the relation between the
length of the critical period and the capitalization at the begin-
ning of the business. In the New Jersey bankruptcies a business-
capital of not more than $500 was found in 9.7% of the cases
with a critical period of less than four months, and in 22.7'1 of
the cases with a critical period of four years or more. In the
Boston business bankruptcies the percentage rose from 22.2cf
in the first "time-group" to 38.1% in the group with a critical
period of four years or more. On the other hand, in New Jersey
46.3% of the cases with a critical period under four months, and
only 22.7% of the cases with a critical period of four years or
more, had started business with a capital of more than $5,000.
In Boston, the corresponding figures were 35.6% and 14.5%,
respectively.
At first glance this seems strange; but a high amount of
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capitalization always indicates the need of large capital and
not always the sufficiency of the provided sum. Wherever high
capital is needed at the initiation of the business, the need for
credit will be correspondingly large during its development. The
insolvency, cutting off new credits, will in such a case soon lead
to bankruptcy.5
V
The length of the critical period is also affected by non-economic
influences such as nationality and tradition. The nationality of
the bankrupts was inquired into at the New Jersey investiga-
tion, but later the question was dropped. Instead, in Boston the
bankrupts were asked about the place of birth of their fathers
and themselves. We may use the place of birth as a substitute
for nationality, considering a person an American if both he
arnd his father were born in the United States, and as an alien
if he or his father were born in the foreign country.
The bulk of the Boston bankrupts consisted of Americans,
Russians and Poles, Englishmen and Canadians. Almost 50%
of the wage-earners were American. Among the business-men,
the Russians and Poles led with 27.9%, leaving the American
second with 23%. In general, the nationality groups do not show
any specific correlation with the length of the critical period.
With one exceptioi: both among wage-earners and business men,
but especially among the latter, the Russians and Poles show a
tendency to shorter critical periods than the other races. Among
the business bankrupts with a critical period under four months
42.2% were Russians and Poles. Among the cases with a critical
period of four years or more, the percentage was only 24.7%.
The corresponding figures in the wage-earner class were 18%
and 11%, respectively.
The business tradition is shown by the length of time the
bankrupt had spent in the trade in which he failed.0 The bank-
rupts who spent less than two years in the business in which
they failed, constitute 55.0% of the cases with a critical period
under four months in New Jersey and 48.9% in Boston. The
percentages of bankrupts who were two or three years in their
business reach the highest points, in the groups with a critical
period of from four months to less than one year and of from
one year to less than two years, 28.0% and 18.5% in New Jersey
and 30.4% and 29.6% in Boston, respectively. The business
men witih from four to five years experience in their trade are
5 In this connection it may be noted that in New Jersey as well as in
Boston corporations had a somewhat shorter critical period than individuals.
a This does not apply, of course, to wage-earners.
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most numerous in the groups with a critical period of from two
to less than three and from three to less than four years, amount-
ing in these groups to 23.0% and 18.5% in New Jersey and to
18.8% and 22.7% in Boston, respectively. Finally, the bank-
rupts who spent sLx years or more in their business, reach by
far the highest percentage in the group with a critical period of
four years or more, namely 78.6% in New Jersey and 59.7%
in Boston.
The figures clearly indicate that the average length of the
critical period is proportionate to the average length of tine
spent by the bankrupt in the bmsiness in which he failed. This
tendency checks the operation of the "rule of decreasing assets."
A very inefficient business man will dissipate more assets in a
short critical period than the average bankrupt. On the other
hand, a longer critical period will not be quite so disastrous to
a bankrupt with many years of experience in his business as to
a newcomer. That the "rule of decreasing assets" nevertheless
prevails, indicates the strength of the destructive influence of
the critical period.
VI
The effects of the critical period on the bankrupts estate must
determine the attitude of the law. The dissipation of most of
the assets occurs, as shown by the "rule of decreasing assets,"
during the critical period. The law must, therefore, first try to
shorten the critical period, and secondly give means to annul acts
committed during this period to the damage of the creditors.
To shorten the critical period means to compel the debtor to
declare his insolvency as soon as it occurs, not to force him into
bankruptcy. On the contrary, friendly adjustments are prob-
ably in many cases better for both creditor and debtor.- But
the debtor must give his creditors the opportunity to decide what
to do in full knowledge of his real situation. The quantity of
cases without assets in the Boston bankruptcies demonstrates
the consequences of a system where the typical answer to the
question, "What adjustments were attempted after the difficul-
ties began?" consists in a simple "none."
The crudest attempt to shorten the critical period may be made
by means of penal provisions. But courts and juries are not
likely to punish bankrupts for mere negligence, notwithstanding
the letter of the law. The denial of discharge would be a better
weapon against debtors who as soon as they are insolvent neither
submit to their creditors an offer of adjustment nor file a peti-
7 Billig, What Price Banktruptcy (1929) 14 CORNELL LAW QUAraERY 413;
Douglas and Marshall, op. cit, supra note 1, at 45.
s Douglas and Marshall, op. cit. supra. note 1, at 42.
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tion in bankruptcy.9 Such a provision would induce the debtors
to declare their insolvency at least before their tardiness be-
comes so apparent that the most benevolent judge cannot over-
look it. Besides, it would relieve the courts of the great bulk
of cases in which the debtor seeks a discharge with no assets left
to pay one cent to his creditors.
On the other side, the debtor who .declares his insolvency in
time should be rewarded by granting him a judicial composition
without formal bankruptcy proceeding. Under the Bankruptcy
Act,-1 a debtor can obtain a composition only if he pays at once
considerable sums. But a bankrupt has, as a rule, no ready
money at his disposal. Therefore, a reasonable time should be
allowed for the payment of the consideration.1
Another way to shorten the critical period consists in facili-
tating the filing of creditors' petitions in bankruptcy. The Bank-
ruptcy Act 2 renders these petitions very difficult by asking
the creditor to prove some "acts of bankruptcy." Besides, there
is no reason to limit the provable "acts of bankruptcy" within
four months before the filing of the petition as the average
critical period in which those acts occur is much longer."
The second end of the law, annulment of acts committed dur-
ing the critical period, cannot be treated in this article, as it
involves the controversy between the protection of the "secur-
ity of trade" and the "equal rights of creditors." But insofar as
we are willing to favor the "equal rights of creditors," it is not
reasonable to restrict the voidability of acts to the period of
four months before the filing of the petition. Most acts by
which the creditors are damaged are committed in the begin-
ning of the insolvency, and the creditors are protected only if
the time to set those acts aside is not less than the average
critical period.
9 The English law provides for denial or suspension of the discharge If
"the bankrupt has continued to trade after knowing himself to be insolvent."
But there is no reason to favour the debtor who is so negligent that he does
not even know his situation, or the debtor who does not continue to trade
but simply lives on his creditors' money.
10 Sec. 12, subdiv. b.
21 Most European statutes provide that the composition shall not be con-
firmed if the consideration does not amount to a certain proportion of the
liabilities. But if the creditors prefer a small dividend to nothing, there is
no reason to deprive them of that. Besides, these provisions have proved
to be ineffective as, in; many cases, the creditors conclude, and the courts
confirm, compositions, knowing that only a part of the promised considera-
tion will be paid. Fiirth, Zwangsvollstreckung und Insolt'enzvcr/ahron
(Execution of Judgments and Insolvency Proceedings) (1930) 48 ZuNTRAL-
BLATT FUR DIE JURISTISCHE PRAXIs 338.
12 Sec. 3, subdiv. b.
13 It will be noted that the Report of the Judicial Conference of Senior
Circuit Judges, 1931, comes, from a very different point of view, in many




Related as it is to the fluctuations of the business cycle, bank-
ruptcy is, in the fust place, a problem of economics. Unfor-
tunately, however, the economists have not, until recently, dealt
with the problem to the same extent as the lawyers. 4
To be sure, one thing has always been known: bankruptcies
are less frequent in times of prosperity than in times of de-
pression.15 But even this truth becomes questionable if we think
of the length of the critical period. Bad times, of course, mean
difficulties for business, but we have seen that difficulties mean
bankruptcy only after a critical period of one year or more, on
the average. The curve of bankruptcies should, therefore, show a
lag of one year or more behind the curve of depression. How-
ever, such a lag is generally not to be found.',
Trying to solve this paradox, we must once more consider the
difference in the length of the critical period in the New Jersey
and the Boston cases. It is easy to understand that friendly
adjustments show a shorter critical period than bankruptcies
and that wage-earners are able to delay bankruptcy longer than
business men. But the distinct difference between the New Jer-
sey and the Boston business bankruptcies needs explanation. The
differences in the amount of liabilities, not very large them-
selves, have been found to have no influence as to the length of
the critical period. Divergences in the types of business and the
average time spent by the bankrupts in their trades do not exist
in a relevant quantity; the same is probably true as to the racial
composition. To be sure, the New Jersey cases include failures
from rural districts, too, whereas the Boston bankruptcies were
limited to an urban area. But in New Jersey the influence of
the metropolitan district of New York prevails besides, it is not
very probable that the critical period is shorter in rural than in
urban areas. On the contrary, people in small towns and vil-
lages are, as a rule, for social reasons, more afraid of bankruptcy
than business men in large cities.
There is only one great difference between the New Jersey
and the Boston bankruptcies; the first occurred during the sea-
son of 1928-29 when the depression had not yet arrived; the
'
4 Holm-Nielsen has announced a book on "Bankruptcy Law and Eco-
nomics," which may fill the gap.
'15 Pietri Torrelli, Dei Fallbizenti co2i Indic delo State Economico c delle
Sue Variazioni (Bankruptcies as Index of the Economic Situation and
Their Variations) (1931) 12 RrviSTA BANCAI A 107, points out different
meanings of the increase and decrease in bankruptcies.




second, two years later when the economic crisis was in full
bloom.
The general economic situation deeply affects the psychology of
the insolvent debtor. In times of prosperity he thinks that
"something" will change and make an end to his difficulties, and
the creditors are apt to share his optimism. When depression
comes, not only is his business hit harder than a sounder firm,
but he also despairs of ending his struggle in victory. He sees
other firms, better founded and highly esteemed, driven into
difficulties, and bankruptcy becoming a common event instead of
a contemptible crime. So, at last, the debtor decides to do what
the state of his affairs required long before. He becomes a bank-
rupt not purely as an economic but, at least partly, as a psycho-
logical victim of depression.
As long as this psychological influence is greater than the
material squeeze of depression, more firms with old difficulties
will go bankrupt than debtors who were solvent until the begin-
ning of the crisis. Therefore, not only the absolute quantity of
bankruptcies will increase as soon as the depression is to be -felt,
but also the percentage of cases with a long critical period will
rise over its normal standard. In the course of time, the bulk
of the firms with old difficulties will be wiped out, and the in.
crease of bankruptcies reduced to the purely economic victims of
the crisis. The percentage of cases with a long critical period
will begin to decline and, finally, fall below the level of times of
prosperity. When depression passes its maximum, the deficit
of "old" cases will soon become greater than the increment of
"young" ones; the quantity of bankruptcies as a whole will fall.
At the end of the depression, also, the number of "young" bank-
ruptcies will decline, till in times of prosperity the normal rela-
tion between cases with long and short critical periods is reached
again.
This hypothesis could explain both the difference between the
average length of the critical period in different stages of de-
pression, and the coincidence of the curves of bankruptcy and
depression in spite of the existence of the critical period. Un-
fortunately, the material on which it is based is too limited and
too uncertain for safe scientific statements. But it would be
worth while to make further research in this direction, com-
paring the critical period during the different stages of depres-
sion within territories of sufficient extent and including the
principal types of business. For if the hypothesis proves to be
correct, the changes in the length of the critical period might be
used for the determination of the actual stage of the business.
cycle and the forecasting of economic developments.
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TABLE I-NEw JERSEY AND BOSTON FAILURES
Number and percentages of failures with a critical ;zrlci of
from 4 from from from
mos. to lyr. to 2 yr-, to 3y r. to feur
under less than less than less than les than ra. or un.
4 mos. 1 yr. 2 ra. 3 yrs. 4 yrs mro kn,-- ttal
New Jersey # 45 02 140 C5 27 2 107 ,51
bankruptcies % 11.4 22.6 35 .5 10.5 6.0 7.1 ... 10.0
Boston business a.45 115 10 152 5 ,- 4 C3
bankruptcies % 7.5 3!.1 2a.5 25.3 S.S 12.8 ... 102.0
Boston iuge-earner # 5 23 54 I3 23 2 14 2-c
bankruptcies % 1.0 11.1 20).0 20.2 11.1 33.1 ... 10.0
-New Jersey friendly # 3 5 4 3 1 0 23 42
adjustents % 19 31 23 10 6 0 ... 10
Boston friendly # 2 13 6 7 6 2 i; 51
adjustments % 5.5 3 17 19 17 .5..5 ... 10
TABLE II-NEw JERSEY FAILURES
Bankruptcies nith a critical rcrlcd of
from from from from
number and 4 mo", to 1 yr. to 2 r. to 3 yrs. to four frxerIly
percentage of under less than less than less than les than Yr. ,r an- adict-
failures 4 mos. I yr. 2 yrs. 3 yrs. 4 yrs. m-re lnown total =1at3
#.7 #0 00 #, 50 # . .0 # 0
m ith no assets a 2.4 5 5.9 1 ('.S 2 3.4 1 3.0 2 3 .0 4 5.4 10 3.7 1 a4
assets $1-500 3 7.3 11 13.0 22 17.2 10 27.0 6 23.1 8 Z-10 21 2. -A 07 1.9 4 0.5
591-1000 3 7.3 , 3.5 11 8.0 9 15.5 1 3.8 2 0.0 4 5.4 23 7.5 4 0.8
1001-2500 5 12.2 12 14.1 32 0-1.0 5 8.6 2 7.7 1 4.0 10 13S5 U7 15.3 10 -:S4
2501-5000 9 22.0 16 1S.7 11 0.6 3 5.2 3 11.6 7 24.0 6 .1 5 12,0 1 1.7
5001-10,000 S 19.5 14 16.5 12 9.4 7 12.1 4 15.4 2 0.0 13 17,0 0l 13.7 3 7.3
10001-25,000 S 19.5 10 11. 23 21.8 7 12.1 4 15.4 1 4.0 0 0.1 CI 14.7 7.3
over 25,00 4 0.5 14 16.5 11 S.6 9 15.3 5 10.2 2 0.0 10 13.5 C5 2.0 Z; 7,3
rnlmown 4 ... 4 ... 12 ... 7 ... 1 ... 3 ... S3 ... C4 ... I ...
Total 45 100.0 19 I00,.0 140 104.0 65 100.0 27 102.0 3 1(.0 17 10.0 r-l IC '. 42 10.0
TABLE III-BOSTON BUSINESS FAILURES
Bankruptcies twith a ercical pjicl of
from 4 from 1 from 2 from 3
-Number and mos to yr. to yrs. to M to fr,,=1y
percentages under lees than less than les than Ic-z than four 3r-. un- adfat-
of failures 4 mos. I V. 2 yr 3yrs. - yr3. or meo Ire msn tstal -C-ots
#0 %. # C # 50 # %, U &0 4 a. I t
With noasset 14 32.6 40 41.5 02 S9.7 03 41.7 09 0.6 47 02.0 0 . -2 44,2 0 0.0
assets $1- 500 10 23.3 20 18.0 43 27.5 39 25.S 12 22.6 13 17.1 . . I40 ., 0 00
501-100 4 9.3 11 9.9 14 9.0 11 7.3 2 3.3 1.3 0 ... 43 7.2 2 4.1
1001-250 6 14.0 12 10.8 11 7.0 16 1t.6 2 3.8 2 2.0 1 ... 3 ,4 12 231,5
201-5000 5 11.6 7 6.3 7 4.5 0 3.3 2 3.8 4 5.3 0 ... 3 55 -Q.0
5001-10c00 1 2.3 . 3.6 6 3.9 5 3.3 0 0.0 3 3.9 0 ... 19 %2 15 30.
10001-25,000 1 2.3 0 7.2 6 3.0 4 2.7 4 7.5 3 3.9 0 ... :r 4.4 f 10.2
over"25000 2 4.6 3 2.7 7 4.5 5 3.3 1 19 3 3.0 0 ... 21 . 5 10 2
Unknos'a 2 ... 4 ... 4 ... I 1... 0 ... 1 ... 0 ... 22 ... 2 ...
Total 45 100.0 115 1(0.0 10 100.0 152 100.0 53 10.0 77 10.0 4 ... CS .0 U1 10.0
TABLE IV-0STON WAGE-EARNER BANKRUPTCIES
Bankruptcles with a critical rcric a of
Numbe" and from 1 from 2 frcm 3
percentages yr. to yrs. to yrS to
of bankruptcies under less than less than less than f*ur yr. un.
I yr. 2 ra. 3 yr& 4 yre or mcre hnwu m t=1
# '7 .0 .# % # 5 C = q 1 = q,
'idth no assets 20 5S.8 41 75.9 00 67.0 23 7,9.3 76 03.5 0 .... 2?5 ."4.5
assets $1- 500 9 26.5 3 14.8 14 2..4 3 10.3 12 13 ,2 4 .... 1 1-0-1
501-1000 0 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 3.4 0 0.0 0 .... 1 0.4
1001-2500 2 5.9 2 3.7 0 0.0 1 3.4 0 0.0 0 .... 5 1.8
2.01-500D - 2 5.9 0 0.0 1 1.9 1 3.4 2 2.2 0 .... 0 2.2
5001-10.000 1 2.9 1 1.0 1 1-0 0 0.0 1 1.1 1 .... ,5 1.9
10401-25,000 0 0.0 2 3.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 ( 0) 0 .... 2 LIS
over 25,000 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 L0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 .... I 0,4
Unknown ka .... 0 .... 0 .... 0 .... 1 .... 0 .... I ....
Total 34 100.0 54 100.0 53 101.0 £,9 10.0 2 1' 5.0 14 .... 270 12.0
Note. The tables to sections IV and V were not printed because of
limitations of space.
